The market for acquiring technology-intensive companies is rife with information frictions and valuation challenges. Although such frictions can stifle trading activity, they also provide room for strategic gain. We investigate this dual role of information frictions in takeover markets by exploiting an institutional reform that released technological information in U.S. patent applications to the public domain. Leveraging cross-sectoral variation in the magnitude of new information disclosure, we find that greater disclosure leads to an uptick in acquisitions. In line with predictions from strategic factor market theory, however, we find that acquirers profit less, especially when target firms are private.
INTRODUCTION
The market for corporate control provides an important avenue for firms to acquire external R&D and complement technological resources developed internally (Bena & Li, 2014; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006) . Scholars have studied how technology acquisitions enable firms to reconfigure their technological resources and access tacit and socially complex knowledge (Desyllas & Hughes, 2010; Karim & Mitchell, 2000) .
Acquisitions also enable firms to expand and strengthen their patent portfolios and to capture important synergies in the process (Chondrakis, 2016; Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014) .
Despite these potential benefits, the market for acquiring technology-intensive companies is widely cast as friction-filled and fraught with hazard. Technology acquirers face substantial search costs and uncertainty over the value of intangible resources or other knowledge-based assets (Coff, 1999; Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2008) . Information asymmetry between bidders and target firms also reinforces the risk of adverse selection. As a result, acquirers struggle to differentiate between more or less promising targets while target firms cannot easily convey their true value to potential acquirers (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008) . In the extreme, information frictions can lead otherwise profitable deals to unravel and limit the role of acquisitions in well-functioning markets for technology (Agrawal, Cockburn, & Zhang, 2015; Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001) .
This study tests the effects of an "information shock" created by institutional reforms to the U.S. patent system (USPTO) on the corporate takeover market and the value captured by acquirers. To do so, we leverage the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), which released information about technological developments in U.S. patent applications to the public domain and affected some industries more than others. We use this differential magnitude in changes in information availability to test effects on corporate takeovers and acquirer returns.
Our findings suggest that information disclosed through AIPA had salient effects on the takeover market. We find a significant uptick in acquisitions in sectors disproportionally affected by AIPA, particularly for firms with prior acquisition experience. We interpret this evidence as indicative of reduced informational frictions and thicker trading activity. In theory, thicker trading could increase the odds of better matches and increase the value-of financing (Saidi & Zaldokas, 2018) . Little is known about the broader implications of this landmark reform on the market to acquire technology-intensive companies-a gap that our study helps fill. In doing so, we contribute to a longstanding policy debate on the disclosure function of patent systems (Chien, 2016; Roin, 2005) .
THEORY & HYPOTHESES
Technology acquisitions provide an avenue for firms to avoid the uncertain process of internal technology development and quickly gain access to technological resources developed externally (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Phillips & Zhdanov, 2012) . Such resources include scientists, patent rights or tacit knowledge embedded in organizational processes and routines (Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007) . Firms also use technology acquisitions as a mechanism to outsource internal R&D and match complementary resources (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006) . The acquisitions create value by bringing together related knowledge bases, overlapping patent portfolios, or necessary complementary assets (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Chondrakis, 2016; Gans & Stern, 2003; Sears & Hoetker, 2014) .
A well-functioning market for corporate control is essential for such gains to be achieved. Much like the broader market for technology (Arora et al., 2001) , however, the market for acquiring technology-intensive companies is fraught with information frictions and valuation challenges. One problem is the risk of adverse selection due to information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target (Akerlof, 1970; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008) .
Target firms have better access to information regarding their technologies and acquirers struggle to discern the real value of resources to be acquired. Targets might be able to remedy that, but they could be unwilling to (e.g., to extract a higher price) or unable to given problems when contracting for knowledge (Arrow, 1962) .
Contracting frictions also can arise due to so-called "symmetric" uncertainty (Arora & Gambardella, 2010) : uncertain expectations about the future value of resources can arise even if neither party has superior insights about such value. Quite simply, as markets evolve or new technologies emerge, the value of the target's resources is gradually revealed. Uncertainty affects both the standalone value of the target's resources and their synergy potential (Coff, 1999) . Uncertainty features prominently in the case of patent rights, with regards to both their grant and enforcement (Gans et al., 2008) . For example, invalidity or (in)advertent infringement might be revealed only after the acquisition has taken place (Fischer & Henkel, 2012) . Taken together, such uncertainty exposes technology acquirers to the winner's curse as they buy resources with imperfect information.
A related friction involves search costs. Much like transactions on the broader market for technology (Agrawal et al., 2015; Gans et al., 2008) , identifying suitable target firms and undertaking due diligence to evaluate the value of their resources can be costly. Given limited investment opportunities, a broad search for different merger options is necessary in order to help identify target firms that better complement the acquirer's resources (Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson, 2008) . This time-consuming process involves extensive environmental scanning and data gathering (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Hitt et al., 1996) , and is particularly challenging for technology-related deals. In the extreme, high search costs can divert acquirers from identifying the best possible matches and, consequently, discourage deals that could benefit both parties (Capron & Shen, 2007; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007) .
Public information disclosure and acquisition activity
The parties involved in the acquisition could, at least partly, attenuate frictions in the market for corporate control by relying on signals from IPOs, alliances, extensive due diligence or different payment methods (Coff, 1999; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007 Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008) . However, these are partial remedies and primarily address problems related to asymmetric information between the acquirer and the target. Here, we consider the effect of increased availability of information related to technological developments in a particular sector to the public domain. How is acquisition activity influenced when the technological frontier in a sector (i.e. information related to all industry participants) becomes more transparent?
The disclosure of information related to the R&D activities of potential target companies naturally reduces information asymmetry between acquirers and targets. As explained before, voluntary early disclosure is less likely to work given the risk of knowledge expropriation. Even so, the effects on acquisition activity are not obvious. In principle, the added information could enable potential buyers to reallocate internal R&D programs more efficiently and lower the cost of inventing around the original discoveries. On the other hand, releasing more R&D-related information to the public domain could serve a marketclearing role: stimulating the completion of more deals by reducing information frictions and contracting problems.
The availability of more R&D-related information also reduces uncertainty regarding the value of target resources by revealing information on technological developments of firms other than the target company. The value of inventions or other knowledge-based resources relies to a large extent on competing or complementary technological resources (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007) . For instance, the public disclosure of different technological solutions to the same problem could reduce uncertainty regarding the likely adoption of the technology offered by a firm that is considered for acquisition.
Or, the disclosure of follow-up inventions could strengthen the negotiating power of old patent holders in settings characterized by cumulative innovation (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Merges & Nelson, 1990; Ziedonis, 2004) . Hence, the disclosure of technological developments to the public domain reduces frictions in the M&A market by reducing uncertainty over the value of the resources to be acquired.
Relatedly, added information should lower search costs. It is well-known that acquirers tend to prefer technologically or geographically proximate targets (Bena & Li, 2014; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011; Schildt & Laamanen, 2006) . This reflects concerns around adverse selection as well as the costs of searching for and collecting information related to the target (Capron & Shen, 2007; Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013) . Information disclosure facilitates search simply by bringing target firms to the attention of potential acquirers.
Moreover, by having more up-to-date access to the latest technological developments, acquirers need to invest less in technological due-diligence. This reduces the overall costs of "transacting" in the market for corporate control. Taken together, the arguments we put forward lead us to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Increased availability of information related to technological developments increases the likelihood of undertaking technology acquisitions.
While an environment characterized by more information disclosure facilitates acquisitions, we expect that the increase in M&A activity will be primarily driven by firms with acquisition experience. To see why note that firms tend to acquire technologically proximate firms. This reflects informational advantages that allow them to identify and evaluate potential targets (Bena & Li, 2014; Chondrakis, 2016; Schildt & Laamanen, 2006) . However, an overall increase in the availability of information reduces the extent of preferential access to information and allows firms to consider acquisitions outside of their core technological domain more easily. In such a regime, the relative importance of private information will decrease while that of acquisition capabilities will be reinforced.
Acquisition capabilities reflect the systems and expertise that firms need to develop in order to perform due diligence, structure contracts, raise funding, devise post-merger integration plans etc. Such capabilities take time to develop though as firms learn to do acquisitions over time (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) . Indeed, Haleblian, Kim & Rajagopalan (2006) emphasize the importance of routines for undertaking acquisitions and show that acquisition experience increases the likelihood of subsequent acquisitions. Likewise, firms with a dedicated M&A function -which develops with experience over time -are found to undertake more acquisitions (Trichterborn, Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, & Schweizer, 2016) . With private information, firms with no acquisition experience face less competition from firms that have developed acquisition capabilities. But firms with previous acquisition experience will be able to act quickly and more easily plan and execute deals when information becomes widely available. In contrast, firms with no acquisition experience lack the necessary capabilities and will face more hurdles when trying to acquire another company. Our second hypothesis therefore is:
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of the increased availability of information related to technological developments on the likelihood of undertaking technology acquisitions will be stronger for firms with prior acquisition experience.
Public information disclosure and acquirer returns
As suggested by Hypothesis 1, increased information availability should facilitate trade in markets for technology firms. A corollary of this increase is a simultaneous increase in bidding competition for target firms. 1 Lower information asymmetry, uncertainty and search costs should stimulate competition in the bidding process to acquire target companies by increasing the number of potential bidders and reducing the variation in private valuations of target firms beyond what would be expected under a regime of more gradual revealing of information. A positive shift in the information environment therefore has important implications in turn for the profits acquirers realize from completing a deal.
A useful anchor here is Barney's strategic factor market theory. Barney (1986) explains that when there is competition for resources and a lack of market frictions, buyers cannot capture value from trade. Indeed, there is substantial evidence pointing to the competitive nature of markets for corporate control as acquirers, on average, struggle to profit from acquisitions (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005; Singh & Montgomery, 1987) . Barney (1988) goes on to suggest though that there is scope for positive acquirer returns in the presence of private information. Private information allows acquirers to take advantage of so-called private synergies since other potential acquirers are unaware of the value, standalone or synergistic, of the target resources.
Acquirers then profit by relying on information frictions in the market for corporate control. But the increased availability of information related to technological developments naturally reduces such frictions as well as the likelihood of capturing value from private information. For example, information disclosure can increase bidding competition by bringing the technological resources of a target firm to the attention of bidders that would have otherwise taken longer to consider the given target for acquisition. Moreover, an acquirer's ability to profit from undervalued technologies is lower when information is disclosed and uncertainty is lower. More firms are likely to understand the value of the technology and enter into the bidding competition with similar valuations, thus reducing any firm's ability to capture value from acquisitions. Finally, the target firm can more easily identify the synergies likely to be realized with a given acquirer when information asymmetry between the two is lower. It can then go on and inform another bidding firm that can replicate such synergies and increase competition, in this way ensuring that the larger part of the synergistic value created goes to the target's shareholders (Barney, 1988) .
Taken together, the early disclosure of technological developments serves as a mechanism that increases competitive bidding, reduces the value of information rents and related private synergies, and decreases the likelihood of positive acquirer returns. Hence:
Hypothesis 3: Increased availability of information related to technological developments reduces the value captured by technology acquirers.
While we expect an overall negative effect of public information disclosure on acquirers' ability to profit from acquisitions, this effect should be more pronounced when the target firm is private. Private firms are more opaque due to less stringent information disclosure requirements as compared to public firms and less information available related to their R&D activities. As a result, acquirers shy away from private targets when facing increased uncertainty and information asymmetry (Shen & Reuer, 2005) . But the limited competition for private targets also increases the scope for taking advantage of private synergies when the target firm is privately held (Capron & Shen, 2007) .
Hence, if the public release of information about new technological developments has a "leveling effect" that reduces the ability of acquirers to profit from private information in the takeover market, the decline in acquirer returns should be more pronounced for takeovers of private targets. The market for the control of private firms is characterized by far more information frictions and faster information disclosure will have a disproportionately negative effect on acquirer returns. Our final hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4: The negative effect of the increased availability of information related to technological developments on the value captured by technology acquirers is stronger when the target firm is private.
THE CONTEXT: AMERICAN INVENTORS PROTECTION ACT
The American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) of 1999 provides a useful vehicle for testing these predictions. Before AIPA, patent applications at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) were published only when the patent was eventually granted. Information in patent application documents, including invention descriptions or correspondence with patent examiners, remained confidential until the issue date. Pre-AIPA, the delay in the disclosure of technological developments to the public domain was considerable; the median patent filed in 2000 took 32.5 months to be granted (Hegde & Luo, 2018) .
Moreover, rejected or withdrawn applications were never made public.
The enactment of AIPA required US patent applications filed on or after November 29, 2000 to be published 18 months after their priority date. The earliest wave of new information released under the new regime therefore started 18 months thereafter, on May 29, 2002. 2 AIPA harmonized USPTO publication rules with those of other international patent offices that required the early disclosure of patent applications. An exception to the new disclosure rule was allowed for patentees who did not want to extend patent protection outside the US. In practice, however, the share of applicants opting out of new disclosure regime remains small (Graham & Hegde, 2015) .
Consistent with the view that AIPA released new information to the public domain, recent studies report beneficial effects on companies seeking to access debt sources of 2 US patents filed at a foreign patent office before filing at the USPTO were already subject to the accelerated disclosure rule, but such patents account for only 20% of all patent applications at the USPTO during the 5year period before AIPA. So, a substantial number of technological developments in patent applications that would have remained secret were published 18 months after the earliest priority date after AIPA's implementation. Moreover, disclosure at foreign patent offices is not as effective as that at the USPTO, given the use of foreign languages and the lack of public records linking USPTO applications with their equivalents at foreign patent offices before AIPA (Hegde et al., 2018; Saidi et al., 2018). financing (Saidi & Zaldokas, 2018) and to license their inventions (Hegde & Luo, 2018) . A recent working paper by Hegde, Herkenhoff & Zhu (2019) further documents a post-AIPA acceleration in the diffusion of technological know-how. In combination, this evidence suggests that AIPA had an economically meaningful shift in the information environment.
AIPA imposed a uniform disclosure rule, but the magnitude with which it released new information about technological discoveries varied markedly across sectors (Saidi & Zaldokas, 2018) . We use this variation to better gauge the causal effect of increased information disclosure on the corporate takeover market and value captured by acquirers conditional on completing a deal. Table 1 reports average patent pendency across sectors included in our analysis. Across industry variation is substantial and relatively stable over time. This reflects differences in the degree of technological complexity, submission requirements or reliance on patenting prior art that influence the examination process (Popp, Juhl, & Johnson, 2004) . To ensure that this heterogeneity is meaningful, we run various t-tests comparing different sectors and were able to easily reject the hypothesis of no differences in patent grant lag. An analysis of variance similarly confirms that mean patent dependency differs significantly across industries (F=66.28, p=0.00).
-Insert Table 1 about here -
The minimum average patent grant lag for industries in our sample exceeds 18 months, so all industries experience an increase in information disclosure post-AIPA. But firms in low average patent grant lag sectors (e.g. engines and turbines or agricultural chemicals) already had relatively rapid access to information in patent documents due to shorter average lags between the initial filing of applications and the issuance of those patents. In contrast, firms in other industries (e.g. aeronautical systems or telephone communications) were facing a much longer lag in the publication of patent applications before AIPA's implementation. Likewise, patent applications are more likely to be published before abandonment in high lag sectors since it is unusual to withdraw patent applications before a 'first action' decision (Carley, Hegde, & Marco, 2015) . The longer the delay in providing a non-final or final rejection, the higher the chance of pre-grant publication. The information shock due to AIPA should therefore be magnified (diminished) for firms operating in industries with longer (shorter) publication lags during the pre-AIPA period.
DATA & METHODS
We test our hypotheses using a sample of completed acquisitions in which the acquirer obtained a majority stake. These acquisitions were announced during the 1997-2006 period and involved US acquirers and targets. We chose this period in order to allow sufficient time to examine patterns of acquisition activity and performance before and after AIPA's implementation. Since our identification rests on industry-level differences in patent pendency, we focus on horizontal acquisitions involving acquirers and targets in the same primary standard industrial classification (3-digit SIC) code. To focus on R&D-and patentintensive sectors, we select sectors with an average R&D intensity of 5% and with at least 50 patents granted to all industry participants during the pre-AIPA period, 1997-2001. This setting is appropriate as AIPA enabled the disclosure of technological developments via the publication of patent applications. The results are robust to use of less stringent R&D-and patent-intensity thresholds.
To focus on deals where technological information is likely to be salient and to estimate the predicted effects, we require acquirers to have at least 5 patents granted during the pre-AIPA period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) and to report data in Compustat throughout the ten-year period.
For target firms, we require at least one patent granted prior the acquisition announcement.
This approach follows the literature in ensuring that the parties involved in the acquisition engage in innovative activity (Choi & McNamara, 2018; Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007) . We collected accounting information and primary industry affiliations from Compustat, acquisition data from SDC Platinum, stock market data from CRSP and patent data from the NBER database (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). 3 In combination, these criteria yield 843 companies from 47 industries. The sample includes 133 distinct acquirers that undertake 225 technology acquisitions during the study period. We use a subsample of these deals, 164 acquisitions involving 107 distinct acquirers, with sufficient data to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 4 .
Dependent variables
Our dependent variable for Hypotheses 1 and 2 is Acquisition dummy, a dummy variable taking the value of one when firm i undertook at least one acquisition of a target firm within the same 3-digit SIC code and with at least one patent in year t. We also calculate Acquisition count, that is the number of acquisitions (defined as before) undertaken by firm i in year t. In practice, there are very few cases where firms undertake multiple technology acquisitions in a given year. We therefore use Acquisition dummy as a dependent variable in our main specifications and perform robustness tests using Acquisition count.
For Hypotheses 3 and 4, we use an event study methodology to calculate acquirer returns (Brown & Warner, 1985) . To do so, we start with a 250-day estimation window [-260, -11] and the standard market model with the CRSP value-weighted market returns as 3 We used an automated process to match all databases that relied on company name and address similarity. This process was manually verified to ensure that false positives and negatives were minimized. We also relied on the NBER link between Compustat firms and patent data but supplemented that with matches from acquisitions that were not already identified in the NBER data. 4 In accordance with studies calculating abnormal returns we excluded 55 deals where the deal value was missing or was below $1 million. An additional 6 deals were excluded as we were unable to calculate abnormal returns due to missing stock market data. benchmark. We then calculate acquirer cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day [-1,+1] and 5-day [-2,+2] event window surrounding the acquisition announcement date. Shorter event windows are generally preferable in order to minimize the impact of confounding events (MacKinlay, 1997) . While some raise concerns about the use of event studies (Zollo & Meier, 2008) , short run abnormal returns are shown to be good proxies for value capture in acquisitions (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992) .
Independent variables
Our key independent variable is Industry patent grant lag, calculated as the average time (in months) it takes from application to publication for patents granted during the 1999-2001 time period to all firms operating in the same primary 3-digit SIC code with firm i.
This variable captures the average delay in the disclosure of patent applications in the years immediately before AIPA's implementation. It therefore allows us to proxy for differences in the magnitude with which new information is made public post-AIPA. The lengthier the average time between patents' application and issue date in an industry, the richer the disclosure of patent applications to the public domain relative to the pre-AIPA period.
We also include Post-AIPA, a dummy variable set equal to one during the [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] period. In practice, AIPA starts releasing new information at the end of May 2002 but we treat year 2002 as the first to be affected by AIPA. For Hypothesis 2 we use Has acquisition experience, a dummy variable equal to one when the firm undertook at least one acquisition during the pre-AIPA period. Finally, for Hypotheses 4 we also use Private target, an indicator set to one if the target firm is privately held (versus publicly traded).
Control variables
We control for a number of factors that could affect the number of technology acquisitions made by firms in a given year. First, we include information on firm sales, debt, profitability and cash. These measures capture scale effects and the availability of financial resources required to undertake acquisitions (Harford, 1999; Jensen, 1986) . We also include information on firm R&D intensity, patent stock -natural log of the citation-weighted count of patents granted to firm i ten years prior to year t -and technological concentration -the non-biased measure of concentration across USPTO patent classes as defined in Hall (2002) for patents granted to firm i ten years prior to year t. These measures reflect a firm's internal knowledge production capacity, which prior studies correlate with acquisition propensity (Bena & Li, 2014; Zhao, 2009 ). Finally, we also include the average number of self-citations out of total backward citations for all patents granted to firm i five years prior to year t. This measure reflects the extent of reliance of firm i on technologies developed internally. Table 2 presents descriptions of all variables used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.
-Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here - To test the effects of information disclosure on acquirer returns for Hypotheses 3 and 4, we include all variables described above and add sources of deal-level variation shown to affect market reactions to acquisition announcements. Specifically, we add dummy variables indication if a deal is financed solely with cash (or equity) given evidence that the method of payment affects abnormal returns in corporate takeovers (Fuller et al., 2002) .
Finally, we add a measure of relative size, defined as the deal value over the acquirer's market capitalization (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004) . Table 3 presents descriptions of all variables used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Econometric specifications
To examine whether the increased availability of technological information resulting from AIPA influenced acquisition activity and acquirer returns, we employ a difference-indifferences (DD) analysis. For Hypothesis 1, we estimate the following model with !"#$%&%'%() +$,,-!"# , indicating the probability of undertaking at least one acquisition by firm i in industry s in year t, as the dependent variable:
where / is the constant term, 2 !# is a vector of time-varying firm controls, ! ! is the firm fixed effects that capture time-invariant, firm-specific differences that influence acquisition propensity and 3 # is the year fixed effects that account for temporal patterns in the market for corporate control that influence all firms. The main coefficient of interest is 4, which tests for changes in acquisition propensity for firms in industries with differential patent grant lags 6 " following AIPA's implementation. Under the assumption that changes in firm's acquisition activity would be comparable for firms in sectors with higher and lower Industry patent grant lag had AIPA not occurred, the DD model allows us to identify the causal effect of new information disclosure. We use a linear probability model with an OLS estimator as we are able to obtain cluster-robust standard errors at the industry level. As explained by Bertrand et al. (2004) , allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure over time within each industry can solve serial correlation problems. Moreover, interaction effects are easier to test and interpret in linear models (Hoetker, 2007) . The results are robust to use of Logit and Poisson models. For Hypothesis 2, we estimate a triple differences model that distinguishes between acquirers that undertook at least one acquisition in the five years immediately before AIPA's implementation and acquirers with no acquisition experience. where / is the constant term, 2 ! is a vector of deal controls, 8 " are industry fixed effects that capture time-invariant, industry-specific differences in acquisition performance and < ! are year fixed effects accounting for temporal patterns influencing acquirer returns. Again, the main coefficient of interest is 4, which tests for changes in acquirer returns in industries with differential patent grant lags 6 " following AIPA. The key identification assumption is that changes in acquirers' returns would be comparable for firms in sectors with higher and lower Industry patent grant lag in the absence of AIPA. For Hypothesis 4, we estimate a triple differences model that further distinguishes between targets that are publicly versus privately held. We use OLS and cluster-robust standard errors at the industry level.
ANALYSIS & RESULTS
We start with Hypothesis 1 and test the effects of added information disclosure on acquisition activity. Table 4 provides summary statistics of the variables included in our analysis. Consistent with previous studies of technology acquisitions (Bena & Li, 2014; Sears & Hoetker, 2014) , we find that firms have a relatively low acquisition propensity.
The likelihood that a firm undertakes a technology acquisition within the same sector is about 2.4 percent per year. Of 843 firms in our sample, 133 (42) firms make one or more (multiple) horizontal technology acquisition during the study period. The average Industry patent grant lag is 28.47 months, but exhibits substantial cross-sectoral variation. Some industries experience almost three years of delay in patent grants, while the average patent pendency period in other industries is less than two years.
We find some prima facie evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 when we look at the preversus post-AIPA changes in acquisition propensity across sectors differentially affected by AIPA. We calculate the change in firm average acquisition propensity before and after AIPA and then group firms in high and low patent grant lag sectors (based on the median).
We find that firms in low lag sectors have a slight drop in average acquisition propensity of 0.002. In contrast, firms in high lag sectors have an increase in acquisition propensity of 0.011 after AIPA, with the p-value of a t-test of the difference between the two at 0.03.
- Insert Tables 4 & 5 about here -Table 5 presents results from the regression analysis. We find positive coefficients for the DD estimator in Models (1) and (2), with p-values of 0.01. This suggests that firms in sectors with relatively high patent pendency, which were the sectors most affected by AIPA, reported increased acquisition activity after AIPA took effect. These increases in acquisition activity are sizeable. To illustrate, based on Model (2), we find that firms in sectors with patent grant lag one standard deviation (2.18 months) above the mean (28.47 months) have a 0.038 probability to undertake a horizontal technology acquisition per year in the five-year window following AIPA's implementation. This compares to a 0.029 probability when Industry patent grant lag is at the mean, thus representing a 31% increase.
The key identification assumption is that in the absence of AIPA changes in firm acquisition activity would be comparable overtime for firms in sectors with high and low
Industry patent grant lag. While it is impossible to formally test this counterfactual assumption, evidence of pre-AIPA trends is reassuring (Roberts & Whited, 2011) . We compare the difference in average M&A growth rates during the pre-AIPA period across two groups of firms, (a) those in industries that are above or equal to the median in Industry patent grant lag and (b) those in industries that are below the median in Industry patent grant lag. A t-test finds no difference between the two (p-value=0.99), suggesting that the two groups exhibited similar acquisition propensity before AIPA took effect.
More visually, Figure 1 plots average M&A propensity across the two group of firms (above or below the median) during our study period. Before AIPA, firms in high-and lowpatent dependency sectors exhibit substantial similarity in M&A activity and follow very similar trends. We are unable to reject the hypothesis that the difference in the pre-AIPA M&A propensity between the two groups of firms is equal to zero (p-value = 0.99). In contrast, firms in sectors with high patent pendency engage in more acquisitions after AIPA's implementation. Figure 1 Has acquisition experience. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive in both models, with p-values of 0.02 and 0.01 respectively, suggesting that firms with prior acquisition experience engage in more acquisitions following AIPA's implementation than firms without experience.
Taken together, these results provide support to Hypotheses 1 and 2. The analysis suggests that an increase in the availability of information related to technological developments is associated with a boost in technology acquisitions. This finding then is consistent with the view that reductions in search costs, uncertainty and asymmetric information between potential acquirers and target companies facilitate transactions in the market for corporate control. Interestingly, firms with prior acquisition experience report sharper increases in acquisition activity in a regime of increased information disclosure.
This finding is consistent with the view that prior investments in building acquisition capabilities facilitate firms in internalizing and acting upon the information revealed.
Robustness tests
We perform a number of additional analyses to test the robustness of our results. First, we calculate Industry patent grant lag based on the median (versus the average) lag of all patents granted to industry participants. Alternatively, we use the average of all patents granted to industry participants five years (versus three years) prior to AIPA's implementation, i.e. 1997-2001. All our results hold. Second, we consider whether our measure of patent grant lag overestimates the delay in the publication of patentable inventions. As discussed before, this could be the case for patents filed at foreign patent offices prior to the USPTO given that most international patent offices were already publishing applications before AIPA took effect. We therefore calculate Industry patent grant lag taking into account the priority dates of patents filed in foreign patent offices prior to the USPTO and an 18-month publication lag (reflecting the potentially faster disclosure of such patents before AIPA). Our results remain unchanged. Third, we are able to replicate our results when including to our analysis sectors that had a minimum of 20 or 100 (as opposed to 50) patents granted to industry participants during the pre-AIPA period. Fourth, we are also able to find support for Hypothesis 1 when employing a fixed effects Logit model with Acquisition dummy as the dependent variable or a fixed effects Poisson model with Acquisition count as the dependent variable. Results are reported in Models (1) and (2) of Table 6 . It is important to note here that both the FE Logit and FE Poisson models rely on a subsample of firms that did at least one acquisition during our study period. This is because the conditional maximum likelihood estimator can only eliminate (i.e. 'condition out') the fixed effects from the estimation equation when there is variation in the dependent variable. Given that, we are unable to test Hypothesis 2 with these models.
-Insert Table 6 about here -Finally, another concern for our analysis is that the increases in technology acquisitions we observe could be driven by other confounding events taking place during the early 2000s, in particular the burst of the so-called "dot-com bubble". It is possible that communications and IT sectors, which were particularly affected by the burst of the bubble and reported substantial drops in acquisition activity (Aharon, Gavious, & Yosef, 2010) , are driving our results. To examine this possibility, we exclude a number of sectors from our analysis 5 and present results in Models (3) to (6) of Table 6 . The DD and DDD coefficients are comparable to those presented in Table 5 , as they remain positive with low p-values in the different models presented. Hence, concurrent events affecting specific sectors in the early 2000s do not appear to drive our results.
Information disclosure and acquirer returns
We now turn to Hypotheses 3 and 4 related to acquirer returns in a regime of increased availability of information to the public domain. To start, we compute the cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers in our sample of horizontal technology acquisitions. The estimation sample contains 164 acquisition deals for which we have deal value information and sufficient stock market data to run an event study analysis. before, acquirers here are larger and have more patents. We find average acquirer returns to be marginally negative, at -0.4%, but indistinguishable from zero. This is consistent with studies in finance that find zero or slightly negative abnormal returns for acquirers (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; Moeller et al., 2005) . Average returns, however, mask substantial heterogeneity across deals. Although acquirer abnormal returns are -0.8% for the median deal, the returns are -4.0%, 2.7%, and 7.2% at the 25 th ,75 th , and 90 th percentile respectively.
-Insert Table 7 about here -To explore the source of this heterogeneity, we focus on acquisition characteristics associated with informational frictions. From the 164 acquisitions in our sample, 122 entailed the acquisition of a private firm. Consistent with previous studies suggesting that decreased information availability on private targets creates more value-creating opportunities for exploiting private information (Capron & Shen, 2007; Chang, 1998) , we find that mean pre-AIPA acquirer's returns for acquisitions of private targets, at -0.03%, are higher than those in deals involving the acquisition of publicly listed firms, at -2.2% (p-value=0.06). Subsequently, we look into high patent grant lag sectors where acquirers' opportunities to take advantage of private synergies are likely more prevalent. We find that acquirer's returns in acquisitions of private targets and in industries with high patent grant lag (above the median) pre-AIPA, at 0.5%, are higher than those in industries with shorter patent grant lags, at -0.2% (p-value=0.32). In combination, this preliminary evidence is consistent with the view that the observed acquirer's returns heterogeneity across technology acquisitions is associated with the presence of information frictions.
To probe more fully how increased information availability and related reductions in informational frictions are associated with acquirer's returns, Table 8 presents results from the regression analysis with cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. In Model (1), we use a 3-day event window and only include the DD estimator. We find that acquirers in sectors with longer patent grant delays experience lower acquirer returns, with the p-value of the DD coefficient at 0.00. This result holds when including firm and deal controls in Model (2). We can see that the drop in acquirer returns is substantial, with acquirers in sectors with patent grant lag one standard deviation (1.70 months) above the mean experiencing a 4.4 percentage points drop in cumulative abnormal returns following AIPA as compared to firms in sectors with patent grant lag at the mean (28.99 months).
-Insert Table 8 and Figure 2 about here -Like before, it is important to verify that the "parallel trends" assumption is not violated.
A comparison of pre-AIPA growth trends in acquirer returns does not reveal any differences between firms that are above or equal to the median in Industry patent grant lag when compared with those below the median (p-value = 0.91). Figure 2 plots the average acquirer returns over time across the two groups. Before AIPA, acquirers in high lag sectors exhibit broadly similar trends in acquirer returns with acquirers in low lag sectors. We also do not reject the hypothesis that the difference in pre-AIPA acquirer returns between the two groups of firms is equal to zero (p-value = 0.66). After AIPA, however, acquirers in sectors with high patent pendency face sharper drops in performance.
Next, we turn to Hypothesis 4 in Models (3) and (4). The coefficient of interest here is that of the DDD estimator (i.e., the interaction between Post-AIPA, Industry patent grant lag and Private target). This triple interaction allows us to examine the effect of increased information disclosure when the target firm is privately owned. In Model (3) we use a 3day event window and only include the DDD estimator with no firm controls. We find it to be negative, with a p-value of 0.07, suggesting that increased information disclosure decreased the returns of acquirers of private targets more relative to the returns of acquirers of public targets post-AIPA. It is preferable though to consider results that control for acquirer and deal characteristics that drive selection into different types of target firms (Capron & Shen, 2007) . In Model (4) we add firm and deal controls and the DDD coefficient remains negative, with a p-value of 0.07. To interpret the magnitude of the reported coefficients in Model (4), acquirers of private targets in sectors with Industry patent grant lag one standard deviation (1.70 months) above the mean (28.9 months) experienced a drop in acquirer returns of 3.4 percentage points after AIPA whereas the change in the returns of the acquirers of public targets was low and not significantly different from zero. Clearly, acquirers of private targets were affected more from AIPA.
Overall, we find reasonable support for Hypotheses 3 and 4: the added release of technological information to the public domain reduced acquirer returns, particularly for takeovers of privately held firms. This evidence is consistent with the view that competition in the market to acquire technology companies intensified and made it more challenging for acquirers to capture value based on private sources of information alone.
Robustness tests and supplemental analyses
Again, we perform a number of additional tests to examine the robustness of these results.
We are able to replicate our findings when using different definitions of Industry patent grant lag (based on the median grant lag, a five-year period before AIPA or an 18-month lag for patents with foreign priority date) and when relying on alternative definitions of patent intensive sectors (i.e. a minimum of 20 or 100 patents granted to firms during the pre-AIPA period, as opposed to 50). We also find support for our hypotheses using 5-day [-2,+2], 7-day [-3,+3], or 4-day [-1,+2] event window.
Next, we explore some extensions of our findings. In particular, we look into the acquisition premia paid and target returns. If increased information disclosure reduces acquirer returns through more intense bidding competition as we argue, then both acquisition premia and target returns should increase as a result. A more intense bidding competition would force acquirers to offer higher bids and would result in a larger share of the value created to be captured by the target. Hence, firms in sectors disproportionately affected by AIPA should pay higher acquisition premia and target firms should have higher returns. To test this conjecture, we present results in Table 9 . Unfortunately, we are able to rely on a very small number of observations, 36 in total, as we can calculate target returns only for publicly traded target firms with sufficient data.
-Insert Table 9 about here -Models (1), (2) and (3) use the acquisition premium based on the target's market capitalization 4 weeks, 1 week and 1 day respectively as the dependent variable. These variables are reported in SDC Platinum. We include the DD estimator without industry or time fixed effects and find some evidence that acquirers pay higher premia post-AIPA. The DD estimator is positive across all three models, with p-value of 0.02 for the 4-week premium, 0.00 for the 1-week premium and 0.00 for the 1-day premium. Looking at the 1week premium, estimates suggest that acquirers pay almost 18% higher premium in sectors one standard deviation above the mean in Industry patent grant lag. It is important to note of course that we see these results as merely suggestive. The low number of observations and lack of appropriate controls limit us from presenting a more definitive test. Models (4) and (5) use the target's cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day [-1,+1] and 5-day [-2,+2] window surrounding the acquisition announcement as dependent variables.
Again, we find evidence that target returns increase as the DD estimator is positive with p-values of 0.06 and 0.04 respectively. The magnitude of the effect is substantial, with target firms in sectors one standard deviation above the mean in Industry patent grant lag reporting 9.2% higher cumulative abnormal returns. This could suggest that more value is captured by the target firm as a result of increased bidding competition. Again, we advise caution in the interpretation of these results as they are merely suggestive. Taken together however, these additional findings provide some evidence consistent with our theory.
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
The corporate takeover market enables firms to access external R&D and to reconfigure internal resources and capabilities (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006) . It is well-known, however, that this exchange arena is challenging for buyers and sellers of technology companies due to high uncertainty and information frictions (Coff, 1999; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007) . Although such frictions can stifle trading activity, they also provide room for strategic gain (Barney, 1988; Capron & Pistre, 2002) .
This study sheds new light on the dual role of information frictions in takeover markets through use of an institutional reform that released technological information in U.S. patent applications to the public domain. Using cross-sectoral variation in the magnitude of new information disclosed by the America Inventors Protection Act, we find that greater disclosure leads to an uptick in acquisitions, particularly for firms with prior acquisition experience. In line with predictions from strategic factor market theory, however, we show further that greater disclosure reduces the returns to acquirers. The leveling effect on acquirer returns is more pronounced for takeovers of privately held targets, where opportunities to profit from private sources of information should have been most affected.
Overall, this evidence is consistent with the view that increases in the disclosure of technological information to the public domain intensifies competition in the takeover market and reduces acquirer opportunities for strategic gain.
Theoretical contributions
Our findings inform theories of markets for technology and how they function (Arora et al., 2001; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Gans et al., 2008) . As in technology licensing markets (Agrawal et al., 2015; Hegde & Luo, 2018) , our evidence suggest that informational frictions and valuation challenges are impediments to technology-related trades and may deter otherwise profitable deals from "getting done." We add to growing evidence that such frictions underpin the corporate takeover market for technology-intensive companies (Akerlof, 1970; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007 . Our findings underscore the importance of investigating the broader performance implications of shifts in the information environment. Even if trading activity intensifies and the market thickens, it is not obvious that acquirers will reap greater profits. Our results are also relevant for resource-based explanations of acquisition performance (Barney, 1988; Capron & Pistre, 2002) . Strategic factor market theory is a key building block of the resource-based view of the firm, but few papers have empirically tested its predictions related to private information and value capture. Our findings are consistent with strategic factor market predictions that information disclosure can endanger the 'private' synergies enjoyed by acquiring firms and thus restrict their opportunities for relative advantage in resource markets.
Managerial & policy implications
This study is relevant to managers and policy makers alike. One of the key points we highlight is that public information disclosure reduces acquirer returns. Managers should therefore be cautious regarding the extent to which synergies can remain private, especially when an ever-increasing amount of data and algorithms become widely available. In the absence of private information, other types of 'inimitable' or hard to replicate synergies will become even more important in securing relative advantage in input markets for strategic resources (Barney, 1988) .
Our study also contributes to a longstanding debate on the design of patent institutions.
The trade-off between knowledge creation and diffusion is well-known, with patents acting as important instruments in balancing the two. The right amount of disclosure is up for debate though, as evidenced by the heated debates surrounding AIPA and its provisions related to the publication of patent applications. Proponents of the law argued that AIPA is beneficial in reducing inadvertent infringement and avoiding the duplication of R&D (Hegde et al., 2019) . Others argued though that the accelerated disclosure of innovation would deleteriously affect small inventors given their limited abilities to protect their rights (Barich, 2001; Gallini, 2002; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004) . Here, we highlight two additional effects of disclosure that could be beneficial for innovation. First, the reduction in frictions in the market for corporate control could help firms identify potential targets and undertake acquisitions. This increase in trading activity could be beneficial for inventors, especially when acquisitions result in synergistic resource combinations. Second, the reduction in value captured by acquirers that we document could correspond to an increase in value captured by targets, which could in turn increase incentives to innovate.
Limitations and future research
A number of limitations apply to our study. Our research design and use of industry-level variation in patent pendency necessitates that we restrict attention to horizontal acquisitions. Future research could study settings where firm-level sources of variation could be better leveraged. We are also unable to observe the actual processes of deciding to undertake an acquisition and the bidding process, implicit or explicit, that we assume is taking place. Hence, additional studies could complement ours by providing more finegrained data related to the decision processes leading to an acquisition. Finally, we do not examine the effects of increased information availability on innovation-related outcomes.
Studies undertaking such an exercise would be useful in further increasing our understanding of technology acquisitions.
In summary, this study investigates an information shock and tests its effects on the market for acquiring technology-intensive companies. We find that greater disclosure of technological information to the public domain intensifies trading activity but reduces the returns to acquirers.
SIC code Description
Average Cash held by firm i in year t divided by total assets Natural log of the citation-weighted count of patent applications granted to the target ten years prior to year t Non-biased measure of concentration across patent classes for patents granted to the target ten years prior to year t A dummy variable taking the value of one when the acquirer paid in cash A dummy variable taking the value of one when the acquirer paid in equity
The relative size of the deal value over the acquirer's market capitalization Natural log of the citation-weighted count of patent applications granted to firm i ten years prior to year t Non-biased measure of concentration across patent classes for patents granted to firm i ten years prior to year t The average number of self citations out of total citations for all patents granted to firm i five years prior to year t A dummy variable taking the value of one when the target firm is private (17) (1) Acquirer returns -0.004 0.065 1.00
(2) Post-AIPA 0.524 0.501 0.06 1.00
( Models (1), (2) and (3) use acquisition premium as the dependent variable. It is calculated based on the target's market capitalization 4 weeks, 1 week and 1 day prior to the acquisition announcement. Models (4) and (5) This graph presents the average acquirer returns for horizontal technology acquisitions across two groups of firms that are (a) above or equal to the median in Industry patent grant lag or (b) below the median in Industry patent grant lag.
